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Abstract: Blue strike aircraft enter region  to attack Red targets. In Case 1, Blue conducts
(preplanned) SEAD to establish air superiority. In the (reactive) SEAD scenario, which is Case
2, such superiority is already in place, but is jeopardized by prohibitive interference from Red,
which threatens Blue’s ability to conduct missions. We utilize both deterministic and stochastic
models to explore optimal tactics for Red in such engagements. Policies are developed which
will guide both Red’s determination of the modes of operation of his engagement radar, and his
choice of Blue opponent to target next. An index in the form of a simple transaction kill ratio
plays a major role throughout. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 723–742,
2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10046*
1. INTRODUCTION: SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSES (SEAD)
In examining SEAD operations it is useful to determine the tactics that maximize the
effectiveness of either the attacking aircraft or the defending integrated air defense system
(IADS). This paper develops models based on two opposing sides: Blue and Red. Blue strike
aircraft (the attackers) are entering a region, denoted as , to attack Red targets. Two cases are
considered. First Blue conducts SEAD—either concurrently with other air missions or prior to
other missions—to establish air superiority. In the second case Blue has already established air
superiority, but then Red introduces prohibitive interference that threatens Blue’s ability to
conduct its missions.
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The models are illustrated based on U.S. Marine Corps SEAD doctrine (U.S. Marine Corps
[13]). Joint doctrine provides a general description of SEAD operations, but does not address
specific tactics. Marine Corps SEAD doctrine is well developed and clearly situates the two
cases modeled. The models and their results, however, are not limited to Marine Corps air
operations. The Red and Blue tactics described by the models can be applied to any side of any
conflict involving attacking aircraft opposed by an IADS. Appendix A provides SEAD-related
definitions paraphrased from doctrinal publications.
1.1. Pre-Planned SEAD
The first case is described by Marine Corps SEAD doctrine as pre-planned SEAD. Joint
doctrine (Joint Chiefs of Staff [6]) describes this type of SEAD as localized. In preplanned
SEAD, Blue aircraft are specifically assigned the task of suppressing air defenses. These efforts
are conducted either concurrently with other air missions (air interdiction, aerial reconnaissance,
etc.)—to create a window of air superiority, or they are conducted prior to other air missions—to
roll back the effective coverage of Red’s IADS.
Blue attackers must enter the engagement envelopes of Red surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to
reach their targets in region . Red SAMs within  attempt to prevent the Blue attackers from
reaching the target area. Blue attackers are supported by Blue SEAD aircraft.
1.2. Reactive SEAD
The second case involves Reactive SEAD (RSEAD). Joint doctrine describes these types of
missions as opportune SEAD (Joint Chiefs of Staff [6]). In this case, Blue has previously
established air superiority in and is conducting air operations such as close air support (CAS).
Red has introduced prohibitive interference (a threat to Blue’s air superiority) with a mobile
SAM. Red is attempting to maximize the number of Blue aircraft killed before the SAM is
suppressed.
Blue is forced to eliminate the prohibitive interference. Several levels of RSEAD are
available: electronic warfare (EW) in support of CAS (Posadas [12]), reactive anti-radiation
missile (ARM) attacks, or a coordinated strike against Red’s SAM.
1.3. SEAD as an Information Duel
The Red IADS gathers and processes targeting information on Blue attackers. The IADS must
complete five functions: detect, identify, track, assign the target, and control of weapons (U.S.
Marine Corps [13]). In the pre-planned SEAD case, Red early warning (EW) radars first detect
Blue attackers, and then identify them as hostile. Next, Red fuses data from multiple sensors to
correlate Blue attackers as target tracks. Blue aircraft are tracked until they can be assigned as
targets to engagement radars co-located with Red SAM batteries. Finally, Red uses engagement
radars to control its missiles through target intercepts. The first four functions (detect, identify,
track, assign the target) are conducted by a command node typically co-located with the EW
radar. Weapons control is executed locally by the SAM.
In the RSEAD case, the Red IADS studied here consists of a single mobile SAM system. All
five functions are conducted by the mobile SAM system. The Red SAM has placed itself amidst
Blue air operations and is operating autonomously (Posadas [12]). While passive measures (such
as optical and infrared measures) are typically used to track Blue aircraft, Red must still employ
engagement radars for missile guidance once a SAM is fired.
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The Red SAMs in both models employ command guidance or semi-active guidance
(MAWTS-1 [10]). These types of SAM guidance require engagement radars (target tracking,
missile guidance, and illumination radars) to radiate throughout the SAM engagement until
missile impact. Blue’s SEAD aircraft remain outside Red’s engagement envelopes and employ
ARMs against Red’s engagement radars. The Blue ARMs passively home on Red engagement
radar emissions. On impact, ARMs inflict damage on the radar and its surroundings.
Red engagement radars can either operate in a continuous emission mode or in an intermittent
(blinking) mode. The intermittent mode is a form of emissions control used by Red for
electronic protection (MAWTS-1 [10]). Continuous mode maximizes the kill probability of Red
SAMs on Blue aircraft. However, continuous mode also maximizes the effectiveness of Blue
ARMs against Red SAM engagement radars. Intermittent mode reduces Red’s ability to kill
Blue attackers, but also diminishes the effectiveness of Blue’s ARMs.
Red’s engagement radar tactics drives the information exchange in these engagements.
Continuous radiation by Red maximizes targeting information for both sides. Red requires
precise position information on Blue attackers for successful SAM engagements. Blue requires
Red emissions to provide guidance information for the ARMs. Intermittent mode presents a
tradeoff option for Red by which more Red SAMs survive, but fewer Blue attackers are killed.
The missile duel (SAM vs. ARM) draws its results from the information duel (Red IADS
targeting vs. Blue SEAD targeting). Red controls the information exchange rate and must
establish a tactic that maximizes the number of surviving Red SAMs, while simultaneously
maximizing the number of Blue kills. In the case of multiple kinds of Blue aircraft, Red can also
decide the order in which it engages the aircraft. In the case of pre-planned SEAD, Blue must
develop a tactic that properly sizes its attack force to succeed in its mission. In the RSEAD case,
Blue seeks to determine the lethality of the Red SAM: How many Blue aircraft would be killed
before the Red SAM is killed? Blue also attempts to determine the best aircraft type to use when
attacking the Red SAM.
1.4. Modeling the Information Duel
Models 1 and 2 describe the pre-planned and reactive SEAD cases in terms of simple
state-space models. Both deterministic and stochastic modeling techniques are used. The
stochastic models are Markov processes and Markov decision processes that can be solved
explicitly in the present circumstances. These models may also be implemented in object-
oriented simulations with stochastic and adaptive features, but this is not carried out in the
present paper.
In each model, more attempted information acquisition exposes the defender to greater risk.
Both models share a common feature: Information acquisition can be both beneficial and
harmful. Both models share a common result: It is possible to derive a tactic that balances the
benefit and disadvantage of information acquisition. Because of the uncomplicated approach, it
is possible to explicitly characterize “optimal” strategies in simple form.
Other analyses of SEAD include Macfadzean [8], Keaney and Cohen [7], and Bailey [1].
High-resolution Monte Carlo simulation is most often used to study suppression of enemy air
defense. An example is Suppressor—a Monte Carlo simulation developed for the Air Force and
maintained at Wright-Patterson AFB in Dayton, Ohio. Bailey [1] presents an analytical model
to study the effects of jamming. The two basic models presented in this paper are limited to
SEAD using ARMs.
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2. MODEL 1: AN EXPLORATORY DETERMINISTIC MODEL
FOR PREPLANNED SEAD
2.1. Assumptions
The following assumptions apply to Model 1:
1. Pre-planned SEAD is being employed by Blue in region , against a fully
operational Red IADS.
2. Blue attackers must enter Red SAM engagement envelopes to reach their targets.
The time spent inside Red engagement zone is Blue’s vulnerability window
(measured in time).
3. Red is defending with several SAMs, using command or semi-active guidance.
These SAMs have overlapping engagement envelopes that create a single en-
gagement zone.
4. Red engagement radars are co-located with Red SAM batteries.
5. Red engagement radars may operate in either continuous or intermittent mode; all
Red engagement radars operate in the same mode.
6. Red does not present a significant fighter threat to Blue.
7. Blue attackers start beyond the radar horizon (undetected).
8. Blue SEAD aircraft are separated from the Blue attackers, and remain outside Red
engagement envelopes.
9. Blue SEAD aircraft fire ARMs on a pre-emptive timeline and have sufficient
ARMs to cover the Blue attackers’ vulnerability window.
10. Red has sufficient SAMs to attack throughout the vulnerability window.
2.2. Scenario
Red’s IADS includes a constant total of REW early warning radars and RA(t) engagement
radars at time t. The IADS functions are represented by EW—the rate at which the IADS
detects, identifies, correlates, tracks and assigns targets, and RB—the rate at which the SAMs
fire and complete engagements (weapons control).
At time t  0, a force of BU(0) Blue attackers crosses the radar horizon of the REW early
warning radars. The number of Blues present, but undetected, at t (undetected state) is BU(t) for
any t  0. Blue attackers are modeled as detected at a rate in time proportional to the number
of undetected Blue attackers at time t  0; (this assumption is easily relaxed, e.g., to essentially
simultaneous detection). The number of Blue attackers detected at time t (detected state) is
denoted by BD(t). The Blue force also includes BS standoff SEAD aircraft that fire ARMs at
Red engagement radars. These aircraft are not subject to attrition by the Red IADS.
Blues detected by Red are processed through the first four IADS functions. Once Blue target
tracks are assigned to SAM batteries, they are processed by individual engagement radars. The
Red IADS passing of Blue target tracks to Red engagement radars is modeled as a service/
queuing system with RA(t) “servers” (i.e., engagement radars). A service time is the time for an
engagement to be completed—from missile firing to an impact or a miss.
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2.3. Dynamic Equations






detection rate of Blue
by Red early warning
. (1)
Equation (1) describes the decline of BU(t)—the undetected Blue attacker population in  at
t. It does not model saturation of the Red early warning system. Undetected Blues become
detected in proportion to their number.
dBDt
dt  EWBUtREW
detection rate of Blue





attrition rate of detected Blues resulting from shooters cued by
acquisition radar, either emitting continuously or intermittently
. (2)
The complete Blue attrition term RBRA(t)(BD(t)/(1  BD(t))) represents the rate at which Red
SAMs engage detected Blues; the component term (BD(t)/(1  BD(t))) represents saturation
of the Red engagement radars by Blue attackers in queue (on the target list). If BD(t)
significantly exceeds unity, then Red SAMs can only complete target engagement at a rate
proportional to their own (current) force size (see Filipiak [2], and Gaver and Jacobs [3]).
Saturability at a larger value can be adjusted by adding a parameter, and provisions for Red’s
loss of Blue target tracks could likewise be made. The effect of Blue decoys can also be added.
The term (RIPRI  RQPRQ) represents the kill probability of a Red SAM that either
chooses to engage a target using continuous emission (the probability of this choice is RI), in
which case the resulting kill probability is PRI; or uses intermittent mode (the probability of this
choice is RQ  1  RI), with kill probability PRQ. PRI is greater than PRQ. Although
continuous mode leads to higher kill probability, it also exposes the Red SAMs to more risk
from Blue ARMS. The parameters RI and RQ are Red decision variables. Simple rules are next
developed for setting these decision variables.
The dynamic equation for Red engagement radars, RA(t), is:
dRAt
dt   RBBSRAt BDtRI1 BDt  BRPBRI
rate at which continuously emitting Red acquisition
radars lead to retaliatory kills by Blue standoff weapon
 RBBSRAt BDtRQ1 BDt  BRPBRQ
rate at which intermittently emitting Red acquisition
radars lead to retaliatory kills by Blue standoff weapon
. (3)
The first term, (RBRA(t)(BD(t)RI/(1  BD(t)))), represents the (saturable) rate at which
the current Red SAMs engage Blue attackers while in continuous emission mode (probability
RI). This rate translates into a rate of attrition of the Red engagement radars in continuous
emission mode by Blue SEAD aircraft: BSBRPBRI. The subsequent term is the same as the last,
but accounts for the occasions on which Red engagement radars emit intermittently, and hence
are killed at a smaller rate: BSBRPBRQ. Although a mixed policy is available, Red is assumed
to employ a pure strategy (set RI and RQ to either 1 or 0).
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2.4. Analysis
Suppose the “combat clock” is started at t  0, with all Blue attackers initially present but
undetected at that time (no continuous arrival of Blue attackers in the present example).
Equations (1)–(3) can be explicitly analyzed in closed form if (t)  0 for all t (all Blues
initially present). The solution to (1) is
BUt  BU0 expREWt	. (4)
Let
 R  RIPRI  RQPRQ
and
 B  RIPBRI  RQPBRQ.






where B (t)  BU(t)  BD(t); of course, B (0)  BU(0).








Divide equation (6) by (5), which results in
dRAt












RAt  RA0. (8)
Notice that the solution is essentially parameterized by an exchange ratio,  R/ B, and the rate
at which SEAD Blue aircraft fire at Red engagement radars, BR.
Since (t)  0 for all t, if t 3 , then either limt3 B (t)  0 or limt3 RA(t)  0. In
fact, if B (0)  (1/BRBS)( R/ B) RA(0), then





RA0 and RA 0; (9a)
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i.e., Blue kills all Red SAM engagement radars; while if B (0)  (1/BRBS)( R/ B) RA(0), then
B ()  0 otherwise, and




So some Red engagement radars survive and are available for countering later attacks.
For a fixed rate at which Blue SEAD aircraft fire at Red engagement radars, BR, it is always
to the advantage of Red to maximize the exchange ratio  R/ B. Doing so either maximizes
Blue’s losses if B (0) is sufficiently large, or maximizes Red’s survivors. Differentiation of the
exchange ratio shows that













Otherwise, Red should employ intermittent mode.
Therefore, Red should emit continuously if Red’s relative advantage from so doing exceeds
the relative advantage to Blue. It is noteworthy that in this model the optimal strategy for Red
holds, regardless of the value of RB, Red’s attrition rate on Blue. Nor does the result depend
on EW, the completion rate of the first four Red IADS functions. Section 3 results in the
reappearance of this tactic in the context of a seemingly quite different stochastic model. Blue
planners can use these results to size an attacking force.
Figures 1 and 2 display the numbers of Red and Blue assets remaining as a function of time.
Parameters for each figure are shown. In Figure 1, there exists one Red early warning radar
(REW  1), and Blue target tracks are processed through the first four IADS functions at the
rate of 10 per minute (EW  10). Each Red SAM can complete one engagement per minute
(RB  1, the Red service rate). The probability of a Red engagement radar, in continuous
mode, killing a Blue attacker, PRI, is 0.7. In intermittent mode, this kill probability, PRQ, is 0.5.
Each Blue SEAD aircraft is capable of firing ARMs at the rate of 1 per minute (RB  1, the
Blue service rate). The probability of a Blue ARM killing a Red engagement radar in continuous
mode, PBRI, is 0.5. Against engagement radars in intermittent mode, the kill probability, PBRQ,
is 0.08.
Figures 1 and 2 involve eight attacking Blue aircraft and four Blue SEAD aircraft against four
Red SAMs. The vulnerability window for Blue attackers is 5 min.
Figure 1 compares the numbers of remaining Red and Blue assets as a function of Red’s
engagement radar mode (continuous or intermittent). Intermittent mode results in fewer Red
casualties and more kills on Blue attackers. More Reds survive and a specified number of Blues
is killed sooner in intermittent mode for the Figure 1 case.
In Figure 2, PBRI is decreased from 0.5 to 0.1. As a result, Blue’s relative advantage
(PBRI/PBRQ) decreases from 6.25 to 1.25. Red’s relative advantage is 1.4 in both cases. In the
case of Figure 2, continuous mode results in more kills for both sides. However, a more
significant increase is observed in number of Blues killed than in the number of Reds killed,
when Red operates in continuous mode in Figure 2.
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In Figure 1, Red’s relative advantage is less than Blue’s; Red has a higher relative advantage
than Blue in Figure 2. According to the derived tactic, Red should use intermittent mode in the
Figure 1 case and continuous mode for the case in Figure 2. The graphical results support this
tactic for maximizing Blue kills and Red survivors.
3. MODEL 2: RSEAD—ELEMENTARY STOCHASTIC DUELS
In Model 2, Blue is employing RSEAD against a “pop-up” Red mobile SAM in region .
Blue is in the midst of CAS operations, in , which require air superiority. The Red SAM has
interfered with CAS by engaging Blue CAS attackers. Blue has SEAD aircraft with ARMs in
. Blue has decided to employ deliberate RSEAD to attack the Red SAM directly with aircraft
diverted from their CAS mission. If the Red SAM has been accurately located, a deliberate
Figure 1. Numbers of surviving Red SAMS and Blue attackers are displayed for two cases: Red
engagement radar using continuous mode and Red engagement radar using intermittent mode. The
exchange ratios favor Red’s use of intermittent mode.
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RSEAD strike can proceed, and Blue SEAD aircraft will support the strike with pre-emptive
ARMs shots. Otherwise, Blue SEAD aircraft will fire reactive ARM shots every time the Red
SAM engages Blue CAS aircraft.
3.1. Assumptions
The following assumptions apply to Model 2:
1. RSEAD is being employed by Blue in region against a single, autonomous Red
mobile SAM.
2. Blue attackers must enter Red SAM engagement envelopes to reach their targets
Figure 2. Numbers of surviving Red SAMS and Blue attackers are displayed for two cases: Red
engagement radar using continuous mode and Red engagement radar using intermittent mode. The
exchange ratios favor Red’s use of continuous mode.
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during CAS. The time spent inside Red’s engagement zone is Blue’s vulnerability
window (measured in time).
3. After Blue attained air superiority in , Red has introduced prohibitive interfer-
ence with a mobile SAM using command or semi-active guidance.
4. The Red engagement radar is co-located with the Red SAM battery.
5. Red’s engagement radar operates in either continuous or intermittent mode.
6. Red does not present a significant fighter threat to Blue.
7. Blue SEAD aircraft are separate from Blue attackers and remain outside the Red
engagement envelope.
8. EW in support of CAS is not sufficient to suppress the Red SAM’s attacks.
Deliberate RSEAD is required.
9. Blue SEAD aircraft fire ARMs in a reactive mode against an unlocated (localized
along a line of bearing) Red SAM, and Blue fires ARMs on a pre-emptive
timeline against a located (to within 100 m2) Red SAM.
10. Shots are exchanged one at a time. Unlocated SAM case: Red fires at a Blue CAS
aircraft; then a Blue SEAD aircraft fires a reactive ARM shot. Located SAM case:
Red fires at attacking Blue aircraft, and a preemptive ARM is fired by Blue SEAD
aircraft.
11. Blue may employ one or more of several platform types in the deliberate RSEAD
strike.
3.2. Model 2a: Unlocated SAM/Reactive ARM
Model 2a is the case where the Red SAM has not been located accurately enough for a
deliberate RSEAD strike. Instead, reactive ARM shots are employed by Blue each time Red
engages Blue CAS aircraft. This model attempts to answer the following questions:
1. How many shots does Red complete, and how many Blues are killed, before the
Red engagement radar is eliminated?
2. What is a good (“optimal”) tactic for the Red SAM to follow so as to maximize
possible Blue attrition before being eliminated itself?
Let KB be the random number of Blues killed before Red is killed. Then
KB  
0 with probability RQ1 PRQPBRQ  RI1 PRIPBRI,
1 with probability RQPRQPBRQ  RIPRIPBRI,
0 KB with probability RQ1 PRQ1 PBRQ RI1 PRI1 PBRI,
1 KB with probability RQPRQ1 PBRQ RIPRI1 PBRI,
(11)
where KB is a random variable having the same (unconditional) distribution as KB: It is the
result of “starting over” (Red engages new CAS aircraft).
Now take conditional expectations to find
E
KB  1  
RQPRQ  RIPRI  
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since E[KB]  E[KB].
For Red, the tactic that maximizes the expected number of Blues killed before it is eliminated















Continuous and intermittent modes are equally effective if equality holds. This can be shown
by examining the derivative on RQ of (12), and is exactly the condition (11) found for the
deterministic model.
3.3. Model 2b: Located SAM/Deliberate RSEAD Allowing for Red Misclassification
of Blue Target Types
In this model, Blue has located the Red SAM with sufficient accuracy to launch a deliberate
RSEAD strike. Several different types of Blue platforms are available for the RSEAD strike.
Assume there are i types of Blue aircraft: i  1, . . . , I. Let PRQ(i) or PRI(i) be the probability
of an intermittently or continuously emitting Red engagement radar resulting in a kill of a type
i Blue aircraft. Let 	i be the probability a Blue target is of type i, i  1, . . . , I. There is the
quite realistic possibility of Red misclassifying the type of a Blue aircraft. Let 
ij be the
probability Red classifies a Blue type i target as a type j target; 















1  ¥i ¥j 	i
ij









To find the values of RQ( j) that maximize E[KB], note that the value of RQ( j) can be
determined for each j independent of the other values. Fix the values of RQ(i) i  j, then
E[KB] can be rewritten as
gRQj 
c10  ¥i 	i
ij
RQjPRQi  RIjPRIi




c11  ¥i i  j
RQjPRQi  RIjPRIi
c21  ¥i i  j
RQjPBRQ  RIjPBRI
, (15)
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where





the conditional probability the target is of type i given it is classified as type j; c1(0), c2(0),




i  j PRQiPBRQ ,
fIj  
i
i  j PRIiPBRI , (17)
and
Mj  maxfQj, fIj. (18)
Since
¥i i  j
RQjPRQi  RIjPRIi
¥i i  j
RQjPBRQ  RIjPBRI
 Mj
for j  1, . . . , I, 0  RQ(i)  1, it follows that the heuristic/approximate tactic to maximize
the expected number of Blue kills for Red is:
For a target that is classified as type j
emit continuously if 
i1
I
i  j PRIiPBRI  i1
I
i  j PRQiPBRQ ,
emit intermittently if 
i





where (16) gives (i  j). In practice, both 	i and {
ij} would have to be estimated or inferred.
3.4. Model 2c: Allowing for Red to Sequence Shots at Blue Target Types
We modify and develop Models 2a–2b as follows: A single Red SAM engages a fixed number
N of Blue CAS attackers. As in Model 2a, every time that Red fires at a Blue aircraft, a Blue
SEAD aircraft fires a reactive ARM shot. As in Model 2b, each Blue can be one of I types and
Red has imperfect information concerning the Blue types he faces. At each stage in the shooting,
Blue will summarize his beliefs about the Blues he faces via a collection of (posterior)
probability distributions. These distributions will be derived using data from Red’s classification
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of the Blues he faces, as in Model 2b, and possibly also data obtained during the engagement
itself. On the basis of these beliefs, Red has to decide at each stage (a) which Blue attacker
should he shoot at next, and (b) in support of this attack, whether Red’s engagement radar should
operate in continuous or intermittent mode.
Red’s objective in developing a strategy for shooting is to maximize the expected number of
Blue attackers destroyed before he is eliminated. We shall consider two scenarios.
3.4.1. Scenario 1
We suppose first that Red shoots at each Blue target (at most) once. Hence, Red’s shooting
strategy involves (a) a sequencing of the N Blues, together with (b) a decision for each Blue
regarding whether Red’s radar should operate in continuous or intermittent mode whenever that
Blue is shot.
Consider (b) first and assume that probability distribution n  {in, 1  i  I}, 1  n 
N, describes Red’s beliefs about the type (i) of Blue n before shooting begins. Following the
analysis of Model 2b to (19), we suppose that Red adopts the following heuristic: Emit
















and emits intermittently otherwise. We use PRn (i) and PBRn to denote the kill probabilities for Red
and Blue, respectively, which result from this decision. Hence, for example, when inequality
(20) holds we have PRn (i)  PRI(i) and PBRn  PBRI. Having determined the level of Red’s
radar operation for each Blue target we now proceed to determine (a), the best ordering of the























LEMMA 1: Given that Red makes decisions about radar levels according to (20), then
shooting at the Blue targets according to the sequence {1, 2, . . . , N } will maximize the
expected number of Blues destroyed before Red is eliminated.
PROOF: We use induction on N, the number of Blue targets. The result is trivial when N 
1. Suppose it to hold for N  k and consider a problem in which N  k  1 with targets {1,
2, . . . , k  1} numbered according to (21). Hypothesize that a sequence in which n  1 is
the first Blue target is uniquely optimal, and obtain a contradiction. Invoking the inductive
hypothesis, the first two targets in the uniquely optimal sequence must be {n, 1} and the









1PR1i  1  PBRn 1  PBR1 V, (22)
where V is the value of the objective for the sequence {2, . . . , n  1, n  1, . . . N }.
However, the value associated with the sequence {1, n, 2, . . . , n  1, n  1, . . . , N }, in
which the ordering of targets 1 and n is now reversed, may be written









nPRni  1  PBR1 1  PBRn V. (23)
















from which it follows easily that the expression in (23) is no less than that in (22). This
contradicts the unique optimality of the proposed sequence which begins with n and the result
follows.
Hence from Lemma 1 and the material preceding, a sound heuristic policy is for Red to shoot
at the Blues according to the ordering in (21). When Red shoots at Blue n his engagement radar
operates continuously if (20) holds, and intermittently otherwise. The reader should note that the
same form of target index arises in the radar decisions in (20) as in the sequencing decisions in
(21).
3.4.2. Scenario 2
Scenario 1 is now developed in such a way that Red is assumed to have access to perfect
intelligence regarding whether his earlier shots at Blue were successful. Hence, at each decision
epoch t  0, 1, 2, . . . , Red shoots at any of the Blue targets still alive at t, and continues to
do so until he himself is eliminated. An additional feature of such a setup is that Red’s beliefs
about the still-alive Blue targets will be modified in light of information received about earlier
shots being unsuccessful. As Red’s beliefs about the Blues he is facing change, so will his
decisions about the mode in which his engagement radars should be operated and also the order
in which Blues should be targeted.
At each time t  0, 1, 2, . . . let A(t) be the set of Blue targets alive at t. If n  A(t), we
write n(t) for the number of times Blue n has been shot at (unsuccessfully) up to t. Further, for
r  1, 2, . . . , n(t) we write M(n, r) for the mode in which Red’s radar was operating when
Blue n was shot at on the rth occasion. We use the notations PRn,r(i), PBRn,r to denote probabilities
pertaining to Red’s rth shot at target n, i.e.,
Mn, r  I f PRn,ri  PRIi and PBRn,r  PBRI. (25)
We also write n,n(t)  {in,n(t), 1  i  I} for the posterior distribution describing Red’s






1  PRn,ri	, 1  i  I. (26)
At each time t, Red will need to decide which Blue from A(t) to target next, and in which mode
his engagement radar should operate in support of that shot. These decisions will be based upon
the collection of independent posterior distributions {n,n(t), n  A(t)}.
As with our analysis of Scenario 1, we first develop a heuristic approach to the radar
decisions. For each n  N, we require a sequence {M(n, r), r  Z} of radar level
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determinations. We obtain a sequence for each Blue in isolation though a dynamic program
(DP), whose goal will be to maximize Red’s probability of killing the individual Blue by a
consecutive sequence of shots. Let V() denote the maximal such probability for a target with
prior distribution   {i, 1  i  I}. V() satisfies the optimality equation














i1 PRQi	VQ  (27)
where the first term in (;), on the rhs of (27), relates to the choice of continuous radar operation
and the second term to that of intermittent operation. In (27) we use I (Q) for the posterior
distribution following a single unsuccessful shot supported by radar operating in continuous
(intermittent) mode, i.e.,
i
Ii1  PRIi	, 1  i  I,
and similarly for iQ, 1  i  I. Use a() to denote the maximizing action in (27). The
maximizing sequence {M(n, r), r  Z} for Blue n will be given by the relations
Mn, r  an,r1, n  I, r  Z, (28)
where n,r1 is the posterior distribution resulting from (unsuccessful) utilization of the first
r  1 terms in the radar sequence. Please note that, from Model 2b, and in particular (19) and
(20), a simpler approach which will provide a good approximation to the above, develops the













f Mn, r  I, r  Z, (29)
with M(n, r)  Q otherwise.
Now consider the problem of how Red should choose a Blue target from A(t) at time t under
the assumption that radar levels in support of shots at each target n will be in accord with the
sequence {M(n, r), r  Z} determined from (28). We require an appropriate development of
the simple index-based sequencing rule given in (21) and develop an index Gn{n,n(t); n(t)} for
target n  A(t) at time t which is a measure of the reward rate available to Red from further
shots (numbered n(t)  1, n(t)  2, . . . , T) on Blue n. The index is given by
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1  PRn,ntsi	1  PBRn,nts	.
LEMMA 2: Given that Red makes decisions about radar levels according to (28), then the
policy which at each decision epoch t  0, 1, 2, . . . shoots at any target n  A(t), such that
Gnn,nt; nt	  max
mAt
Gmm,mt; mt	 (31)
maximizes the expected number of Blues destroyed before Red is eliminated.
COMMENTS:
1. Glazebrook, Gaver, and Jacobs [5] show that Red’s problem of maximizing the
expected number of Blues to be killed before he is himself eliminated may be
modeled as a generalized bandit problem once the radar levels have been estab-
lished. From Nash [11], an index policy is optimal. See Glazebrook, Gaver, and
Jacobs [5] for details of the derivation of the index in (30) and (31).
2. The reader may easily check that upon substitution of n(t)  0, r  1 in the









Hence the indices in (21) may be viewed as special cases of those in (30), which
are appropriate when Red is restricted to (at most) one shot at each target.
3. Manor and Kress [9] argue the importance of scheduling problems of the kind we
have discussed above. In a scenario which is, in most respects, simpler than that
considered here, they develop an index policy for (optimal) shooting.
4. Although the index policies in Lemmas 1 and 2 are developed for static environ-
ments in which the Blue target population is fixed, the developed indices will
continue to be an effective decision support tool for situations in which the targets
in range are continually changing. See Gaver, Glazebrook, and Pilnick [4] for
comments on the robustness of index policies in the context of a ship replenishment
problem.
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5. We conducted a numerical investigation of the index policy in Lemma 2 in a
situation in which the radar was assumed to be operating at a single level
(continuous emission, say) throughout, but where the retaliation kill probabilities
were assumed to be Blue-type dependent. Lemma 2 may easily be extended to take
account of the latter complication. The scenario investigated envisaged the Blue
targets being of two types, with b1 being of type 1 and b2 of type 2. Red uses a
sensor to initially estimate the type of each Blue target. The probability that Red
classifies a type i target as type i is , i  1, 2; otherwise it is classified (wrongly)
as the other type. Under an assumption that Red attaches a probability of 0.5 to
each Blue type before receiving the classification information, we infer from an
application of Bayes’ theorem that Red’s prior for each Blue classified as type 1 is
(, 1  ), while his prior for those classified as type 2 is (1  , ).
A simulation model implemented two shooting policies for Red: (i) an (optimal) index policy;
and (ii) random shooting in which, at each decision epoch, Red chooses to engage one of the
remaining Blues chosen at random (with equal probabilities). Results are presented in Tables 1
and 2. In each cell of both tables we report the estimated mean number of Blues killed prior to
Red’s destruction, with the corresponding standard error in brackets. The upper figures in each
cell correspond to the index policy and the lower figures to the random shooting policy. All
entries are based on 1000 replications.
As might be expected, the index policy outperforms the random shooting policy other than at
  0.5, where the sensor does no better than the flip of a fair coin and the two policies are
statistically virtually identical. The level of excess number of Blues killed achieved by the index
policy is remarkably high when Red receives high quality information from the sensor assets
(i.e.,  is high). However, even rather mediocre information (  0.6, say) can be put to very
good use by Red. The value of the information to Red is unsurprisingly greater when the Blue
types are more distinct.
Table 1. The mean number of Blues killed by Red prior to Red’s own destruction under (i) an index
policy and (ii) a random shooting policy.
 (b1, b2) (2, 8) (4, 6) (6, 4) (8, 2)
1 (i) 2.0 (0.06) 2.7 (0.07) 3.0 (0.09) 3.3 (0.09)
(ii) 1.3 (0.05) 1.7 (0.06) 2.1 (0.07) 2.6 (0.09)
0.95 (i) 1.9 (0.05) 2.5 (0.07) 2.9 (0.08) 3.3 (0.09)
(ii) 1.5 (0.06) 1.6 (0.06) 2.0 (0.07) 2.7 (0.09)
0.9 (i) 2.0 (0.06) 2.4 (0.07) 2.9 (0.08) 3.1 (0.09)
(ii) 1.3 (0.05) 1.7 (0.06) 2.1 (0.07) 2.6 (0.09)
0.85 (i) 1.8 (0.06) 2.3 (0.07) 3.0 (0.09) 3.1 (0.09)
(ii) 1.4 (0.06) 1.7 (0.06) 2.0 (0.07) 2.6 (0.09)
0.8 (i) 1.7 (0.06) 2.1 (0.07) 2.9 (0.08) 3.0 (0.09)
(ii) 1.4 (0.06) 1.7 (0.07) 2.2 (0.08) 2.5 (0.09)
0.7 (i) 1.5 (0.06) 2.1 (0.07) 2.5 (0.08) 2.9 (0.09)
(ii) 1.4 (0.05) 1.8 (0.06) 2.0 (0.07) 2.6 (0.08)
0.6 (i) 1.4 (0.05) 1.9 (0.07) 2.2 (0.07) 2.8 (0.09)
(ii) 1.4 (0.06) 1.7 (0.06) 2.0 (0.07) 2.6 (0.09)
0.5 (i) 1.3 (0.05) 1.7 (0.06) 2.1 (0.08) 2.7 (0.09)
(ii) 1.4 (0.06) 1.7 (0.07) 2.1 (0.08) 2.6 (0.08)
Blue types more alike: PR(1)  0.6, PBR(1)  0.4; PR(2)  0.4, PBR(2)  0.6.
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4. SUMMARY
Red’s IADS and Blue’s SEAD were modeled as service systems where SAMs and ARMs
duel using engagement radar emissions as information. The IADS service system has a finite
lifetime. The assignment of a system is to kill incoming strike aircraft (Red), or impact
defending engagement radars (Blue). The service systems’ lifetimes and the amount of work
accomplished during the lifetime depend on the level of effort (emission mode) of the servers
(engagement radars). It also depends on the quality of information available to Red and Blue.
For Red, a high level of effort (continuous mode) may result in more work completed (Blue
attackers killed per unit time), but a shorter lifetime. Lower effort (intermittent mode) by Red
may result in less work accomplished, but a longer lifetime. However, there are cases where
lower effort by Red maximizes the work accomplished because more Red SAMs survive to
continue working. Decision rules (tactics) were derived to maximize the amount of work (Blue
attackers killed) accomplished by the service system (Red’s IADS) during its lifetime. The
decision rules pertain both to the level of effort and the type of Blue target to be engaged.
An analysis of Red’s IADS by Blue can provide detailed information on the sizing of an
attack force. These models apply to both pre-emptive SEAD against a full IADS, and to reactive
SEAD against a single, autonomous SAM. It is also possible to extend the model to make the
effect of Blue SEAD efforts more robust by including decoys, jamming, and saturation of Red
EW radars. The latter situations are subjects for later research.
APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY
Anti-Air Warfare (AAW)—Action required to gain and maintain air superiority.
Prohibitive Interference—Enemy influence that denies previously established air superiority.
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)—Action that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades surface-
based enemy air defenses by destructive or disruptive means.
• Concurrent SEAD—Destructive or disruptive efforts simultaneous with other missions such as air interdiction,
armed reconnaissance, or close air support.
Table 2. The mean number of Blues killed by Red prior to Red’s own destruction under (i) an index
policy and (ii) a random shooting policy.
 (b1, b2) (2, 8) (4, 6) (6, 4) (8, 2)
1 (i) 2.1 (0.04) 3.3 (0.06) 4.2 (0.08) 5.0 (0.10)
(ii) 0.8 (0.04) 1.3 (0.05) 2.0 (0.07) 3.1 (0.09)
0.95 (i) 1.9 (0.05) 3.1 (0.06) 4.0 (0.08) 4.8 (0.10)
(ii) 0.9 (0.04) 1.4 (0.05) 2.0 (0.07) 3.1 (0.09)
0.9 (i) 1.8 (0.05) 2.7 (0.06) 3.7 (0.08) 4.7 (0.10)
(ii) 0.9 (0.04) 1.4 (0.05) 1.9 (0.07) 3.0 (0.09)
0.85 (i) 1.6 (0.05) 2.5 (0.06) 3.6 (0.08) 4.4 (0.10)
(ii) 1.0 (0.04) 1.3 (0.05) 1.9 (0.07) 3.1 (0.09)
0.8 (i) 1.4 (0.05) 2.3 (0.07) 3.1 (0.08) 4.3 (0.10)
(ii) 0.9 (0.04) 1.2 (0.05) 2.0 (0.07) 3.1 (0.09)
0.7 (i) 1.2 (0.05) 2.0 (0.06) 2.7 (0.08) 3.9 (0.10)
(ii) 1.0 (0.05) 1.3 (0.05) 2.0 (0.07) 3.0 (0.09)
0.6 (i) 1.1 (0.04) 1.5 (0.05) 2.3 (0.07) 3.4 (0.09)
(ii) 0.9 (0.04) 1.2 (0.05) 2.0 (0.07) 3.0 (0.09)
0.5 (i) 0.9 (0.04) 1.3 (0.05) 2.0 (0.07) 3.1 (0.09)
(ii) 0.9 (0.04) 1.4 (0.05) 1.9 (0.07) 3.2 (0.09)
Blue types less alike: PR(1)  0.7, PBR(1)  0.3; PR(2)  0.3, PBR(2)  0.7.
740 Naval Research Logistics, Vol. 49 (2002)
• Pre-Planned SEAD—Destructive or disruptive efforts allocated or apportioned through the normal air tasking
order cycle to target strategic surface-to-air missiles early warning and ground controlled intercept radar sites,
command and control nodes, and other integrated air defense components.
• Sequential SEAD—Preemptive destructive or disruptive efforts that precede other missions to introduce a
“window of air superiority.”
Reactive SEAD (RSEAD)—SEAD for reestablishment of air superiority after enemy introduces prohibitive inter-
ference with a surface-to-air threat.
• Alert RSEAD—Dedicated RSEAD Assets on Air or Strip Alert prepared to strike an enemy surface to air threat
once it has been located.
• Deliberate RSEAD—Coordinated response to strike an enemy surface-to-air threat with assets diverted from other
missions.
• Immediate RSEAD—Self-defense attack on an enemy surface to air threat by a platform that locates the enemy
air defense asset targets while conducting another mission.
APPENDIX B: INDEX OF SYMBOLS
Section 2.3
BU(t)  number of undetected Blue attackers at time t,
BD(t)  number of detected Blue attackers at time t,
BS  number of Blue standoff SEAD aircraft,
RA(t)  number of Red engagement radars at time t,
(t)  arrival rate of Blue attackers at time t,
EW  rate at which integrated air defense system (IADS) detects, identifies, tracks, and assigns a Blue
attacker,
RB  rate at which surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) fire and complete an engagement against an assigned
Blue attacker,
BR  rate at which a standoff Blue SEAD aircraft fires at a Red engagement radar,
RI  probability Red engagement radar emits continuously while guiding a surface-to-air missile
(SAM),
RQ  probability Red engagement radar emits intermittently while guiding a surface-to-air missile,
PRI  probability a Blue attacker that is engaged by a SAM guided by Red engagement radar emitting
continuously is killed,
PRQ  probability a Blue attacker that is engaged by a SAM guided by Red engagement radar emitting
intermittently is killed,
PBRI  probability a Blue standoff SEAD aircraft kills a Red engagement radar emitting continuously,
PBRQ  probability a Blue standoff SEAD aircraft kills a Red engagement radar emitting intermittently.
Section 3.2
KB  random number of Blue attackers killed before a Red engagement radar is killed.
Section 3.3
I  number of types of Blue attackers,
RI(i)  probability Red engagement radar emits continuously while guiding a SAM toward a Blue
attacker of perceived type i,
RQ(i)  probability Red engagement radar emits intermittently while guiding a SAM toward a Blue
attacker of perceived type i,
PRI(i)  probability a Blue attacker of type i that is engaged by a SAM guided by a Red engagement radar
emitting continuously is killed,
PRQ(i)  probability a Blue attacker of type i that is engaged by a SAM guided by a Red engagement radar
emitting intermittently is killed,
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	i  probability a Blue attacker is of type i,

ij  probability Red classifies a Blue attacker of type i as an attacker of type j,
(ij)  conditional probability a Blue attacker classified as a type j is a type i.
Section 3.4
N  number of Blue attackers,
i
n  prior probability Blue attacker n is of type i,
PRn (i)  probability Red kills Blue attacker n which is of type i using the best heuristic policy
for engagement radar mode,
A(t)  set of Blue attackers alive at time t,
n(t)  number of times Red has shot at Blue attacker n during the first t shots,
M(n, r)  mode (continuously or intermittently) Red’s engagement radar is operating in for the
rth engagement against Blue attacker n,
PRn,r(i)  conditional probability Blue attacker n is killed as a result of the rth engagement which
uses the best heuristic for engagement radar mode given the attacker is a type i target,
PBRn,r  probability Blue SEAD aircraft kills the Red engagement radar after the rth engage-
ment of Blue attacker n when the engagement radar is using the best heuristic
engagement mode,
i
n,n(t)  posterior probability Blue attacker n that has been unsuccessfully engaged n(t) times
is of type i,
i
I  posterior probability Blue attacker is of type i following an unsuccessful engagement
using a Red engagement radar operating in continuous mode,
i
Q  posterior probability Blue attacker is of type i following an unsuccessful engagement
using a Red engagement radar operating in intermittent mode,
n,r1  posterior distribution of the type of Blue attacker n given the attacker was unsuc-
cessfully engaged r  1 times,
Gn{n,n(t); n(t)}  index for Blue attacker n that has been unsuccessfully engaged n(t) times using the
best policy for engagement radar modes.
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